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THIS LAND IS MY LAND: THE NEED FOR A FEASIBILITY
TEST IN EVALUATION OF TAKINGS FOR PUBLIC
NECESSITY
THOMAS J. POSEY*
"Government is instituted to protect property of every sort....
[T]his being the end of government, that alone is a just government,
which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own."'
INTRODUCTION
A Midwestern state with a one million dollar transportation
budget proposes to deal with its traffic problems by building a huge
superhighway at a cost of eighty-four million dollars. The state has
shown a public necessity for traffic reduction, and has condemned the
land of several private citizens in anticipation of the project's com-
mencement. Can the landowners stop the taking of their land on the
grounds that completion of such a project is impossible? According
to recent decisions in the state courts of Iowa and Minnesota, the
answer is no. But shouldn't the government be required to show that
a proposed public necessity project is feasible before being allowed to
exercise its power of eminent domain?
One of the most essential sticks in the bundle of property rights
is the right to exclude others.2 It is through this fundamental right
that the security of both ownership and use of land are maintained by
private citizens.' The importance of this right, however, does not
supersede the government's powers of eminent domain.
4
Federal and state governments, through the use of eminent do-
main, may condemn the property of a private landowner and use that
* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2003; M.S.W., University of Illinois-Chicago, 1997;
B.S. Psychology, Illinois State University, 1994. The author wishes to thank Jeff Enright, Molly
Joyce, Melanie Maron, and Professor Fred Bosselman for their invaluable assistance in the
completion of this Note.
1. James Madison, Property, NAT. GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in 1 THE FOUN-
DERS' CONSTITUTION 598 (Phillip B. Kurland et al. eds.,1987).
2. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
3. William Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political
Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 793-96 (1995).
4. Id. at 804.
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property to meet a public necessity.' If the landowner challenges the
condemnation, the courts generally perform an extremely narrow
review of the government's decision to take the land.6 In order to
prevail, the landowner must show either that the taking was in
violation of constitutional or statutory provisions, or that some gross
impropriety such as fraud or abuse of discretion occurred. 7 However,
landowners generally may not base their challenges on the grounds
that the proposed project is unfeasible or unlikely to be completed.8
This rule is clearly illustrated by two recent state court decisions.
In Itasca County v. Carpenter, a private citizen's land was con-
demned for the purpose of constructing a road. 9 The landowner
challenged the taking on the grounds that completion of the project
was impossible. He argued the road could not be completed because
one area it was proposed to cross was federally protected Native
American land that could not be condemned.1° Although the trial
court agreed, holding that the impossibility of completing the road
was sufficient grounds to prevent the condemnation, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals reversed." The court indicated that once necessity
had been established, the government was authorized to take the land
despite any allegations or speculation that the project would never be
completed."2
Similarly, in Comes v. City of Atlantic, the condemnation of pri-
vate land for an airport expansion project was allowed, despite
evidence that the project might never even be undertaken. 13 The city
sought to condemn a private citizen's land, but lacked the funding to
complete the planned expansions.14  The trial court granted the
private landowner a permanent injunction that barred the city from
taking his land until it received funding and approval for the project. 5
5. Catherine Lehmann, Dolan v. City of Tigar& A Heightened Scrutiny of the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 32 Hous. L. REV. 1153, 1154 (1995).
6. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1984) (quoting Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26,32 (1954)).
7. See, e.g., Luloff v. Lichty, 569 N.W.2d 118, 123 (Iowa 1997) (citations omitted);
Douglass v. Iowa City, 218 N.W.2d 908, 913-14 (Iowa 1974) (citing Scott v. City of Waterloo,
274 N.W. 897, 900, 901 (Iowa 1937)).
8. Douglas, 218 N.W.2d at 913-14.
9. Itasca County v. Carpenter, 602 N.W.2d 887, 888 (Minn. App. Ct. 1999).
10. Id. at 888.
11. Id. at 891-92.
12. Id. at 891.
13. Comes v. City of Atlantic, 601 N.W.2d 93, 96 (Iowa 1999).
14. Id. at 95.
15. Id.
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However, the Supreme Court of Iowa reversed that decision, holding
that once the government had shown the property was needed for a
public use, it could invoke its powers of eminent domain.
16
The practical effect of these holdings is to weaken the security of
private land rights by making it less difficult for the government to
exercise eminent domain powers. In both these cases, the govern-
ment was allowed to condemn private lands for a public necessity,
despite evidence that the land might never be used to alleviate that
necessity. The reasoning in these cases may set the dangerous
precedent of allowing the government to take any land it wishes by
simply showing that the land may someday be put to public use.
Part I of this Note outlines the background necessary to analyze
the exercise of eminent domain powers by state governments. Part II
presents the facts of Itasca County v. Carpenter and Comes v. City of
Atlantic and considers the legal analyses of the courts in both cases.
Part II also proposes that these courts erred in their rigid adherence
to the notion that the feasibility of public necessity projects should
never be judicially examined. Although there will always be some
possibility that a project designed to meet a public necessity will not
be completed, landowners should be able to raise feasibility chal-
lenges in certain limited circumstances. Part III proposes judicial
means to limit the use of eminent domain in cases where the govern-
ment is unlikely to use the condemned land to complete the necessity
project. It suggests that judicial review of the feasibility of proposed
necessity projects should be performed, but only in those cases where
such review is warranted through a burden-shifting test. Further, Part
III proposes that at least a rational basis standard of review should be
applied to governmental feasibility determinations. This section
concludes by addressing common arguments against judicial inquiry
into the feasibility of necessity projects and points out flaws in the
economic reasoning of those arguments.
I. THE EXERCISE OF EMINENT DOMAIN POWERS BY STATE
GOVERNMENTS
Eminent domain is a power exercised by all governments and is
generally considered to be an inherent element of sovereignty. 7 The
16. Id. at 97-98.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883); Lara Womack, Private
Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 28 REAL. EST. L.J. 307, 308-09 (2000).
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legal basis for the exercise of eminent domain by the United States
government is found in the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.'
The Takings Clause allows the federal government to seize private
land, but only in cases where that land will be put to a "public use." 19
The government generally performs such seizures either following a
judicial hearing, or as a "quick take" without notice or hearing by
simply filing a declaration of taking or obtaining an ex parte order for
possession.20  The government is then required to provide "just
compensation" for any property that is taken. 21
In addition to these takings by condemnation, the federal gov-
ernment may also effect a taking by regulating land use through its
police powers. 22 Such regulations are enacted for the purpose of
maintaining or improving some aspect of public safety, health, or
welfare. 23 While these regulations deny private landowners the right
to use some or all of their land as they wish to, they do not deprive
them of actual ownership.24 As such, no monetary compensation is
required since the landowner is "compensated" by sharing in the
social benefit the regulation provides.25
Like the federal government, state governments26 also possess
eminent domain powers. 27 State governments are similarly limited by
the public use and just compensation requirements, as the Fourteenth
Amendment28 makes the provisions of the Takings Clause applicable
to the states.29 Most states have explicitly incorporated provisions
similar to those of the Takings Clause into their own constitutions,
18. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
19. Id.
20. United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 21 (1958).
21. Id.
22. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992).
23. Id. at 1019-22.
24. Id.
25. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980).
26. State governments, city and local governments, school districts, counties, and even
public utilities possess eminent domain powers. Sidney Z. Searles, The Law of Eminent
Domain in the U.S.A., C975 ALI-ABA 333,336 (1995).
27. The state may execute a taking through either its eminent domain powers, or by
regulating land through its police powers in the interest of public health, safety, welfare, or
morals. No compensation is required when a regulatory taking is made, as the landowner is
"compensated" by sharing in the benefit the regulation provides to her and the rest of the
general public. See id. at 351; see also Laura McKnight, Regulatory Takings: Sorting Out
Supreme Court Standards After Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 41 U. KAN. L. REV.
615, 617-18 (1993).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
29. Id.
[Vol 78:1403
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which further highlights the importance of meeting the public use and
compensation requirements. 0
Although both the federal and state governments are limited in
the exercise of their eminent domain powers by the "public use"
requirement, the Takings Clause does not define that term. This has
led to varying judicial interpretations of what constitutes a public use.
The two principal interpretations of the term can be categorized
according to actual-use and public-benefit theories.
31
A. Actual- Use vs. Public-Benefit Theory
Eminent domain decisions through the early twentieth century
generally adhered to the actual-use theory, which defines public use
narrowly.32 Under this theory, the specific use for which the property
is taken must be one that all members of the public will share equally
and to which they will have universal access.33 For example, taking
land to build a public road, park, or airport is permissible because all
members of the public will potentially enjoy actual use of that land.
Conversely, a government taking to build a private road would not be
allowed, because the public would not be able to use or access it.1
4
Over the last several decades, however, the public-benefit theory has
been adopted, which is more expansive in its scope.
Public-benefit theory broadly defines public use as any use that
will benefit or advantage the general public.35 The government may
use eminent domain to achieve "any legislatively permissible end"
that will in some way benefit the public welfare, even if the general
public will be denied actual use of the land.36 For example, any
condemnation by the state for the purpose of enlarging the resources
available to the community as a whole is permissible.37 The most
significant implication of this broad definition is that it allows the
30. Forty-nine states have incorporated such provisions into their constitutions. The only
state which has not, North Carolina, provides these same protections through statutory law.
Searles, supra note 26, at 335-36.
31. Nathan Alexander Sales, Classical Republicanism and the Fifth Amendment's "Public
Use" Requirement, 49 DUKE L.J. 339, 344 (1999).
32. See, e.g., Bunyan v. Comm'rs of the Palisades Interstate Park, 153 N.Y.S. 622 (1915)
(taking land to create a public park constitutes taking for public use); In re City of New York,
147 N.Y.S. 1057 (1914) (taking to build a subway is taking for public use).
33. Pocantico Water Works Co. v. Bird, 29 N.E. 246, 248 (N.Y. 1891).
34. See Carpenter v. City of Buffalo, 244 N.Y.S. 224 (1930).
35. Sales, supra note 31, at 348-50 (1999).
36. Id. at 345-47.
37. Id.
2003]
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government to take land from one private citizen and give it to
another private citizen or entity, as long as the taking will provide a
public advantage.3 8
In Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,39 for exam-
ple, the local government seized an entire residential neighborhood
and then transferred the land to the General Motors Corporation to
build an auto assembly plant.4° The government reasoned that
building the plant would help alleviate some of the severe economic
blight occurring in Detroit at the time. 41 The potential economic
benefit was held sufficient to establish a public use. 42 Similarly, in
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the state condemned the
property of several wealthy landowners who controlled most of the
private land in the state, then divided it amongst a large number of
citizens.43 Because the destruction of this oligopoly of land ownership
would greatly benefit the general public, the taking was held to be a
public use.44
B. Standard of Judicial Review
The broad definition of public use suggested by public-benefit
theory and applied in Midkiff led to the establishment of a minimum
scrutiny test.45 Heightened levels of scrutiny are considered unneces-
sary because this inclusive definition made virtually any taking that
benefits the public permissible.46 Under the minimum scrutiny test,
any exercise of eminent domain that is rationally related to a conceiv-
able public purpose is allowed. 47  The courts will not question or
examine a legislative determination that a public necessity exists, nor
will they examine whether a legislatively proposed taking will serve to
meet that necessity. 48 Judicial review is generally limited to determin-
38. Such takings still require that just compensation be paid to the initial private owner. Id.
at 347-49.
39. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
40. Id. at 457.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 459-60.
43. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232-34 (1984).
44. Id. at 240-42.
45. Womack, supra note 17, at 315.
46. Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 1997).
47. Milligan v. City of Red Oak, 230 F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Nat. R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 422 (1992)).
48. Richardson, 124 F.3d at 1158.
[Vol 78:1403
THIS LAND IS MY LAND
ing whether the taking constitutes a public or private use. 49 However,
this deferential standard of review is not required where the proposed
public use involves an "impossibility" or is "palpably without reason-
able foundation. '5
0
Although Midkiff established the minimum scrutiny test as the
appropriate standard of review, the United States Supreme Court
applied heightened rather than minimum scrutiny in a number of
subsequent cases. 1 These cases, however, are distinguishable because
they all involve regulatory takings rather than condemnations.52 The
rationale for applying heightened scrutiny to regulatory takings is that
such takings are uncompensated.53 The Court will examine such
takings more closely to insure the government is not using its regula-
tory power to place public economic burdens on the shoulders of
private individuals.5 4 The Court's language in Midkiff has been
interpreted to support this rationale.55 Because Midkiff requires
deference to legislative decisions where a taking is fully compensated,
such deference is presumably not required where no compensation is
made.56 In the regulatory cases, the courts are protecting the eco-
nomic rights of the landowner. 7 But in condemnations, those rights
are already protected by the compensation requirement. 8
C. Practical Effects of the Minimum Scrutiny Test
The states have taken advantage of the virtually absolute def-
erence shown by the courts to legislative necessity decisions and have
frequently tested the limits of their eminent domain powers. Such
efforts have largely been successful because most courts will only
overturn a legislative determination of necessity where fraud, bad
49. Searles, supra note 26, at 343.
50. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1984) (citing Old Dominion Co. v.
United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925); United States v. Gettysburg Elec. R. Co., 160 U.S. 668,
680 (1896)).
51. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Calif. Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
52. Id.
53. Regulatory takings interfere with a landowner's right to quiet enjoyment without
providing any monetary compensation for the lost use. Such takings are subject to a more strict
judicial review to insure they are only used when necessary. See Richardson, 124 F.3d at 1157-
58.
54. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389-90.
55. Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150, 1158 (9th Cir. 1997).
56. Cf id.
57. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992).
58. Id. at 1015.
20031 1409
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faith, or gross abuse of discretion can be proven. 9 However, the
courts have been inconsistent in their response to state and local
governments' attempts to expand the concept of necessity.
In Anaheim Union High School v. Vieira, for example, the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal held that a school district could condemn land
for the purpose of building a school, despite the fact that it would not
be constructed for at least four years.60 Similarly, in Charlotte v.
Rousso, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the city of
Charlotte could take property to build a park, even though no specific
plans or design for the proposed park had been made.61 Likewise, a
Pennsylvania trial court in In re Condemnation of School District held
that a taking for a proposed school was permissible where plans for
the project had not even been authorized. 62 More recently, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals in City of Duluth v. State held that even
takings that are merely "convenient for the furtherance of a proper
purpose" are allowed.63
Not all courts, however, have allowed such broad extensions of
the concept of necessity. In Phoenix v. McCullough, for example, the
Arizona Court of Appeals held that the city could not condemn land
for airport expansion where it did not plan to begin construction for
fifteen to forty-six years. 64 In another airport expansion case, Mann v.
City of Marshalltown, an Iowa state court determined that where
there was not a reasonable probability that the government would
complete the proposed project, condemnation should not be al-
lowed.65 But despite these decisions, it is generally extremely difficult
to contest a taking on the basis of lack of necessity.
59. See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Milligan v. City of Red
Oak, 230 F.3d 355 (2000); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455
(Mich. 1981).
60. Anaheim Union High Sch. Dist. v. Vieira, 241 Cal. App. 2d 169, 172 (1966).
61. City of Charlotte v. Rousso, 346 S.E.2d 693, 694 (N.C. 1986).
62. In re Condemnation by Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh, 244 A.2d 42 (Pa. 1968).
63. City of Duluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757, 764-65 (Minn. 1986) (quoting City of
Pipestone v. Halbersma, 294 N.W.2d 271, 274 (Minn. 1980)).
64. City of Phoenix v. McCullough, 536 P.2d 230, 237 (Ariz. App. Ct. 1975).
65. Mann v. City of Marshalltown, 265 N.W.2d 307,315 (Iowa 1978) (quoting Falkner v. N.
States Power Co., 248 N.W.2d 885, 891-93 (Wis. 1977)).
[Vol 78:1403
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II. ITASCA COUNTY V. CARPENTER AND COMES V. CITY OF
ATLANTIC
Two recent state court decisions clearly illustrate the effect of de-
fining public use broadly and of applying minimum scrutiny review in
eminent domain cases. Part A of this section examines the facts and
legal analysis performed in Itasca County v. Carpenter. Part B
presents the similar legal reasoning performed in Comes v. City of
Atlantic. Part C suggests that both courts erred in their rigid adher-
ence to broad definitions of public use and permissive standards of
review.
A. Itasca County v. Carpenter
Itasca County, Minnesota condemned land owned by Douglas
Carpenter, a private citizen, for the purpose of constructing a road.6
6
After a court authorized the county to take his property, Carpenter
learned that the proposed route of the highway would also require
the condemnation of federally protected tribal land owned by another
private individual.67 That land, however, could not be condemned
without the consent of its owner, who testified he would never give
such consent.68 Because the road was now impossible to complete as
planned, Carpenter moved to dismiss the county's petition for con-
demnation.
69
The district court agreed with Carpenter and dismissed the
county's petition to condemn his land, on the grounds that the
proposed public use of his land was now a legal impossibility.70
However, the Court of Appeals reversed, stating that its own review
of the law of eminent domain led to the opposite conclusion. 71 The
court quoted the Midkiff2 case, indicating that judicial review of
condemnation petitions is required to remain extremely narrow.
73
The court stated that it would rest its decision solely on its finding
66. Itasca County v. Carpenter, 602 N.W.2d 887, 888 (Minn. App. Ct. 1999).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 888-89.
69. Id. at 888.
70. Id. at 889.
71. Id. at 891-92.
72. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
73. Carpenter, 602 N.W.2d at 889 (citing Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240).
20031
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
that the trial court had not made an extremely narrow review of the
condemnation petition.
74
The court indicated that the Minnesota Constitution provides
that property may be condemned once a public use has been estab-
lished.75 The government, however, has the burden of establishing
that the condemnation is necessary to achieve some public purpose.
76
The court pointed out that according to City of Duluth v. State, as
long as the taking is reasonably necessary or convenient in achieving
that purpose, the government's burden is met. 7  In addition, the court
added that once necessity is established, a condemnation can only be
prevented by a showing that it is manifestly arbitrary or unreason-
able.78 Proving that the project has only speculative purposes or is
impossible would meet this standard.
79
The court stated that speculative purpose was not an issue in this
case because there was a specific plan for the construction of a road.80
Further, the court noted that the project was not a legal impossibility
because the purpose could still be attainable. 81 The court suggested
that the government might "find a way" to complete the project by
modifying the current road plan.82 However, the court stated that the
ability of the county to complete the project was "not at issue," and
that the only relevant consideration was whether condemnation of
the defendant's land was reasonably necessary to accomplish the
purpose of building a road.83 Since both the public purpose of the
project and the means employed to achieve that purpose were legal,
the court reasoned that no inquiry into the feasibility of the project
was warranted. 84
The court held that because there was a plan for the road, and
modifications to that plan could allow it to be completed, the defen-
dant's land was reasonably necessary to achieve a public purpose.
85
74. Id.
75. Carpenter, 602 N.W.2d at 889 (citing MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13).
76. Id. at 889 (citing County of Dakota v. City of Lakeville, 559 N.W.2d 716, 720 (Minn.
App. Ct. 1997)).
77. Id. (citing City of Duluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757, 764-65 (Minn. 1986)).
78. Id.
79. See id.




84. Id. at 890.
85. Id. at 891.
[Vol 78:1403
THIS LAND IS MY LAND
The court added that to hold otherwise would require countless
judicial reviews of the practicability of legislative plans and decisions
and would contradict well-settled principles of eminent domain. 86
B. Comes v. City of Atlantic
In 1999, the city of Atlantic, Iowa developed a comprehensive
master plan for the expansion of its airport.87 The plan was designed
to be long-term and would be implemented in stages over a number
of years."' Completion of the project would require the acquisition of
private property adjoining the airport, as well as the rerouting of a
road that crossed that property. 89 The project depended on receipt of
funding from the federal government for which the city had applied.90
James Comes owned the private farmlands bordering the city air-
port.91 Fearing that the city may prematurely condemn his property
before being approved for federal funds, he sought an injunction
against any condemnation attempts by the city.92
The trial court held that although it was possible that the city
would receive the funds and complete the project, it could not con-
demn Comes' land until the federal funds had been approved. 93
There was still a significant possibility that the city would not receive
the funding and that no expansion would ever take place.94 The court
entered a permanent injunction against the city, which prevented
condemnation of Comes' property until the necessary funding was
obtained.95
The appellate court reversed the trial court's grant of the injunc-
tion and remanded the case.96 The appellate court' based the decision
on its finding that there was no likely obstacle to the completion of
the project.97 The court indicated that the Iowa Constitution limits
takings to those made for public use. Further, there is a constitutional
86. Id.





92. Plaintiff sought a permanent injunction against the city to bar present and future




96. Id. at 98.
97. Id.
20031
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requirement that such takings must be reasonable and necessary.98 To
obtain an injunction against such takings, the court stated that land-
owners must show fraud, abuse of discretion, violation of constitu-
tional or statutory provisions, or the presence of some other gross
impropriety.99
The court focused its analysis on whether uncertainty surround-
ing the approval of funding was sufficient to hold the constitutional
requirement of a public purpose had not been met.10° The court noted
the similarities between the present case and Mann v. City of Mar-
shalltown,10 1 which also involved airport expansion. Quoting Mann
and Faulkner v. Northern States Power Co.,102 the court stated that a
reasonable probability that the government will complete a proposed
project is sufficient to establish a right of condemnation. °3 The court
reasoned that unless the plaintiff proved the city could not reasonably
expect to use his property for airport expansion, there was no basis
for an injunction. °4
The only major uncertainty presented by the plaintiff was
whether the federal funds would be available to complete the pro-
ject.105 Although the court conceded that there was a possibility that
the funds would not be received, it held this was an insufficient basis
to block the condemnation of the plaintiff's land.1 6 The court re-
versed the injunction and remanded the case to the trial court for
entry of an order dismissing the plaintiff's petition.107
C. Flawed Reasoning in Carpenter and Comes
The reasoning of the courts in Carpenter and Comes is problem-
atic in several respects and illustrates the danger of allowing the
unchecked expansion of a state's exercise of eminent domain. The
courts in both cases failed to give adequate consideration to the issue
98. Id. at 95-96 (citing IOWA CONST. art. I, § 18; Vittetoe v. Iowa S. Utils. Co., 123 N.W.2d
878, 880-81 (Iowa 1963)).
99. Comes, 601 N.W.2d at 96 (citing Mann v. City of Marshalltown, 265 N.W.2d 307, 314
(Iowa 1978)).
100. Id. at 96.
101. Mann, 265 N.W.2d at 314.
102. Faulkner v. N. States Power Co., 248 N.W.2d 885, 893 (Wis. 1977).
103. Comes, 601 N.W.2d at 96-97 (quoting Mann, 265 N.W.2d at 315).
104. Id.
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of impossibility. Further, the courts' ambiguous and overinclusive
standards of what constitutes "necessity" and public use threaten to
further broaden these seemingly unrestrained terms. Conversely, the
foci of both courts' reviews of the facts was far too narrow in scope.
These deficiencies are further emphasized by the courts' failure to
suggest any limitations or guidelines to be used in applying their
holdings.
1. Redefining Impossibility
While the dispositive issue in both cases should have been the
impossibility of completing the proposed projects, the courts simply
redefined the evidence of such impossibility that was before them to
reach their holdings. In Carpenter, the court stated that once neces-
sity was established, the only way to prevent the taking was by
showing that it was manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable, and indi-
cated that impossibility met this standard. 1°8 Although the court
acknowledged the proposed road was now impossible to complete as
planned, it suggested the government might modify the plan and
"find a way" to somehow make completion possible. 109 But using
such a hypothetical analysis serves to guarantee a different impossi-
bility: landowners will be forced to defend themselves against con-
demnations for impossible projects.
The reasoning of the Carpenter court seems to suggest that in any
case where a proposed project is impossible to complete, the govern-
ment may simply argue that it will change the proposal, even if the
only proposed modification is to "find a way to make it work."'
110
And, although the court stated early in its opinion that impossibility is
one of the few ways to prevent a condemnation, it later stated that the
ability of the county to complete the project was "not at issue." 1 '
These conflicting positions indicate that although the court techni-
cally acknowledges impossibility as one of the few defenses available
to a landowner, it does not consider that defense to be an issue
meriting judicial review.
In Comes, the court engaged in a similar reframing of an impos-
sible project. 12 Although the project may be able to be undertaken at
108. See Itasca County v. Carpenter, 602 N.W.2d 887, 889-90 (Minn. App. Ct. 1999).
109. Id. at 891.
110. Id.
111. Seeid. at 891.
112. See Comes, 601 N.W.2d at 95.
2003]
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some point in the future, at the time the case was decided it was
impossible to complete. 113 No funding had been secured for the
multimillion-dollar airport expansion project, and the court conceded
that it was uncertain whether the city would ever receive such fund-
ing.114 In addition, the court cited the Mann case where a condemna-
tion for airport expansion was not allowed because of uncertainties
surrounding project funding."5 Yet the court held that it could
reasonably be expected that the property would be used for airport
expansion and allowed the taking." 6 While the court stated that
uncertainty surrounding a project may be sufficient to prevent a
condemnation and referenced the Mann case as support, it held that a
completely unfunded multimillion-dollar project was certain enough
to allow a taking.,,7 Such a holding effectively erodes the ability of a
landowner to challenge an impossible project.
2. Overly Broad Definitions
In addition to concerns regarding impossibility, the courts' am-
biguous definitions of "necessity" and public use are far too broad. In
Carpenter, the court adopted the reasoning from Duluth, that even a
taking that is "convenient" in achieving a public purpose can establish
the government's proof of a public use." 8 The Comes case appears to
hold that "uncertainty" surrounding the completion of a project is
sometimes sufficient to prevent condemnations, but offers no stan-
dards or guidelines for evaluating such uncertainty." 9 While the court
distinguishes its holding from that of the Mann case, it does not
provide any discernable reasons for doing So. 120 Viewed together, the
ambiguous definitions in Comes and Carpenter suggest that any
taking that is convenient to government attainment of a public use
should be allowed, except in some cases where project completion
appears uncertain. Such a permissive and ambiguous standard allows
few challenges, if any, to an impossible or unfeasible project.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 98.
115. Id. (citing Mann v. City of Marshalltown, 265 N.W.2d 307,314 (Iowa 1978)).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Itasca County v. Carpenter, 602 N.W.2d 887, 889 (Minn. App. Ct. 1999) (citing City of
Duluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757, 764-65 (Minn. 1986)).
119. See Comes, 601 N.W.2d at 96-97.
120. See id.
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3. Scope of Review
The scope of review employed by the courts is also problematic.
While judicial reviews of condemnations are generally performed
narrowly, the court in Carpenter took this notion to the extreme. 2'
The court refused to consider issues of feasibility and necessity, and
focused only on whether the trial court's review should have been
more narrow.
12
While the court in Comes was willing to address the feasibility is-
sue briefly, it failed to examine or explain in any detail the factual
differences between its holding and that of the Mann court. The
court limited its analysis to the determination of whether any possibil-
ity existed for completion of the project. Once it found that such a
possibility existed, the court looked no further. Such narrow and
limited analyses endorse the notion that there should be few obstacles
to exercises of state eminent domain powers.
4. Failure to Limit Powers
The most consistent and problematic flaw throughout both opin-
ions is the failure to identify any limit to the powers that may be
exercised by the states. For example, how much modification to a
proposed public use plan should be allowed before that plan can be
deemed impossible, and thereby unconstitutional? What degree of
uncertainty must be present to declare it unlikely that a proposed
project can ever be completed? If the proposed project will not even
commence for several years, how many years are enough to consider
the taking arbitrary or unreasonable? Leaving such questions unan-
swered threatens to expand the states' powers, which are already
extensive.
III. PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE
FEASIBILITY OF PROJECTED NECESSITY PROJECTS
While judicial review of the feasibility of proposed necessity pro-
jects is not warranted in all cases, it is defensible in those where the
government is highly unlikely to use the condemned land to complete
the necessity project. The burden-shifting test outlined below pro-
vides a means to identify the cases where such review is justified. The




government's feasibility determinations in those cases should be
reviewed under a rational basis standard to insure appropriate
judicial deference to the legislature's lawmaking actions. Although
common arguments against allowing judicial inquiry into the feasibil-
ity of necessity projects will be addressed, these arguments are not
implicated by the limited and narrow level of judicial review being
proposed.
A. Burden-Shifting Test
The use of a burden-shifting test is not a new concept in either
constitutional law or eminent domain. It has been used as a test for
substantive due process in both of these areas. 123 For example, since
the end of the Lochner24 era in 1938, the Supreme Court has held
that economic regulations are presumptively valid.'25 Courts presume
that facts exist which support any legislative economic decision that
was made, and the challenger bears the burden of showing that no
rational basis exists for the regulation.126 Similarly, until the 1995
Dolan decision, challengers to regulatory takings were required to
show that the regulation they opposed had no substantial relation to
public health, safety, or welfare. 27 The nature of the government's
power in both of these examples explains the rationale for using a
burden-shifting test. Because government power in these areas is not
absolute, challenges are allowed. However, the extensiveness of
these powers suggests the burden of proving unconstitutionality
should fall on the challenger rather than placing a burden on the
government.
Likewise, the government's condemnation powers under the
Takings Clause' 28 are extensive but not absolute. Private land may be
taken, but only where compensation is made and the land will be put
to public use.129 Because the nature of this power is the same as that
of the economic and regulatory takings powers discussed above, it is
logical to apply the same type of test. Such condemnations may be
challenged because the government does not have an absolute power
123. See Lehmann, supra note 5, at 1169-73.
124. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
125. Lehmann, supra note 5, at 1170.
126. Id. at 1169-70.
127. Id. at 1155-56.
128. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
129. Id.
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to condemn. However, the broad nature of this power suggests that
the landowners should bear the burden to disprove the constitutional-
ity of the taking. Applying a burden-shifting test, a proposed neces-
sity project would be presumed constitutional until the landowner
met the burden of proving that completion of the project is either
impossible or highly unlikely. Once that burden is met, condemna-
tion should not be allowed unless the government can show that a
rational basis in fact exists to believe the project can be completed.
This rationale is consistent with that of the trial courts in the
Carpenter and Comes cases, which were decided correctly.13° Follow-
ing the landowners' challenges to the condemnation of their land,
they had the burden of proving the takings were unconstitutional. 3'
The landowners in both cases presented evidence that established the
impossibility of completion of the proposed public use projects.
13
1
Further, the government in each case did not present evidence
showing that a basis existed for believing completion was possible.'33
As such, the trial courts did not allow the takings.134
The higher courts purportedly based their decisions on the fail-
ure of the landowners to prove that the government's necessity
projects could not be completed.' Nonetheless, in Carpenter, the
appellate court did not dispute that the landowner had proven the
impossibility of completing the road as planned. 36  Similarly in
Comes, the landowner showed that the city had not secured any
funding whatsoever for its proposed multimillion-dollar airport
expansion. 37  Rather than requiring the landowners to meet their
burdens of proof, it appears both courts simply redefined what was
meant by "impossible." Further, the government was not required to
refute the challengers' evidence or to make any showing that the
projects were possible to complete.
38
If the courts in those cases had applied a burden-shifting test, the
government would have been required to show there was some
130. Comes v. City of Atlantic, 601 N.W.2d 93, 94-95 (Iowa 1999); Itasca County v.
Carpenter, 602 N.W.2d 887, 888-89 (Minn. App. Ct. 1999).
131. Comes, 601 N.W.2d at 94-95; Carpenter, 602 N.W.2d at 888-89.
132. Comes, 601 N.W.2d at 94-95; Carpenter, 602 N.W.2d at 888-89.
133. See Comes, 601 N.W.2d at 97-98; Carpenter, 602 N.W.2d at 890-92.
134. See Comes, 601 N.W.2d at 97-98; Carpenter, 602 N.W.2d at 890-92.
135. See Comes, 601 N.W.2d at 97-98; Carpenter, 602 N.W.2d at 890-92.
136. Carpenter, 602 N.W.2d at 890.
137. Comes, 601 N.W.2d at 98.
138. See Comes, 601 N.W.2d at 97-98; Carpenter, 602 N.W.2d at 890-92.
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rational basis to believe the projects could be completed. In Carpen-
ter, for example, the government was able to show that the road could
be partially built,139 but could not have met the burden of showing
that the entire project might be completed. The challenger presented
undisputed evidence that the road would progress no further than the
property line of the Native American land near his own land. 14 Upon
this evidence no basis existed to believe the road project could ever
reach completion. 141 While it is possible that some other means of
completing the road may have been available, such as rerouting it
through other land, the government was never even required to make
such a showing. After Carpenter met his burden by proving the
project was impossible, the burden should have shifted to the gov-
ernment to at least show the existence of a rational basis to believe
the project could be completed.
Similarly, in Comes, the landowner met his burden of proof by
showing that no approval, permits, or funding had been secured by
the state for its proposed multimillion-dollar project. 42 Although the
state may have been able to obtain such approvals and funding later,
at the time the case was decided it had not done so. 43 There was no
basis in the evidence provided to believe the government would
obtain these prerequisites and even begin the project, let alone
complete it. 44 Because Comes met his burden, the government
should have been required to establish a rational basis for believing
the airport could be completed.
Despite the uncontested evidence provided by the landowners in
both cases, the higher courts did not shift any burden to the govern-
ment or require additional evidence before allowing the takings. 4
This is the greatest potential difficulty in applying the burden-shifting
test. Courts may continue to simply expand the definition of impossi-
bility in an effort to avoid reviewing legislative determinations or
offending separation of powers requirements. This has the practical
effect of negating the burden-shifting test by establishing a burden
that cannot be proven with even the most egregious set of facts.
139. Carpenter, 602 N.W.2d at 891.
140. Id. at 890.
141. Id.
142. Comes, 601 N.W.2d at 94-95.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Comes, 601 N.W.2d at 97-98; Carpenter, 602 N.W.2d at 890-92.
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To prevent this problem, it may be necessary for the legislature
to outline standards for determining whether a project is impossible
or highly unlikely to be completed. For example, where funds have
not been secured for a project, a history of successful attempts to
obtain funding for similar projects may suffice to show that it is likely
to be obtained in the instant case. In cases where physical impossibil-
ity of completion is alleged, evidence of alternative plans that over-
come those physical barriers could disprove the allegations. But even
without such legislative standards, there should be little doubt in the
courts' minds that physically impossible or completely unfunded
multimillion-dollar projects suffice to establish a landowner's burden
of proof.
B. The Standard of Review
A proposed necessity project will be presumed constitutional un-
til the landowner meets the burden of proving that completion of the
project is either impossible or highly unlikely. Once that burden has
been met, condemnation should not be allowed unless the govern-
ment can show that a rational basis in fact exists to believe the project
can be completed. Applying this level of scrutiny is necessary to
insure that the benefits of the burden-shifting test are not under-
mined. Although this is a higher level of scrutiny than what is cur-
rently applied, it more closely resembles the minimum scrutiny used
in Midkiff'46 to evaluate public use in compensated takings rather
than the heightened scrutiny147 applied to regulatory takings in
Dolan.14
Recall that a regulatory taking requires a higher standard of re-
view because of the potential for public economic burdens to be
placed on private individuals.149 However, Midkiff held that takings
through condemnation, which are compensated, only require the
government to meet a conceivable rational basis standard to establish
that the taking has a public rather than private purpose.50 Because
146. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1984).
147. The most deferential standards of review are conceivable rational basis and rational
basis in fact. The more stringent standards of intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny are
collectively referred to as heightened scrutiny.
148. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 389 (1994).
149. Id. at 389-90.
150. However, this deference to the legislature is not required where the proposed public
use involves an "impossibility" or is "palpably without reasonable foundation." Midkiff, 467
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the economic rights of the landowner are protected through the
compensation requirements, this deferential standard is all that is
necessary.' The compensation requirement, however, does not
protect the landowner's right to quiet enjoyment of the property.
One of the most basic property rights is that of quiet enjoy-
ment.1 12 This includes both the right to use your property as you see
fit and the right to prevent others from using it.153 Exercise of emi-
nent domain serves to permanently deprive landowners of this right
by transferring ownership of their land to the government. But
should this right be denied when the government has no factual
evidence to show it will ever put the land to public use? If the gov-
ernment is only required to meet the conceivable rational basis
standard 154 of Midkiff,155 then a taking for an impossible project would
be allowed as long as completion is even conceivable.
Every conceivable explanation of how the project might be com-
pleted would suffice to uphold the taking. Physically impossible road
construction projects and unfunded multimillion-dollar airport
expansions would be allowed without requiring the government to
show any factual evidence that completion of such projects was
possible. Further, such a standard has the same adverse effect on the
burden-shifting test as expanding the definition of impossibility.
Rather than making it impossible for landowners to meet their
burden using any fact pattern, it makes it possible for the government
to meet its burden with virtually every fact pattern.
If a case involves such an impossible or unreasonable foundation,
and the landowner has met the burden of proving this, the govern-
ment should be required to show that there is at least a rational basis
in fact to believe that the project can be completed. This standard of
review is necessary to protect both the landowner's rights and the
effectiveness of the burden-shifting test. It requires the government
to provide factual evidence that a proposed project is not impossible
before interfering with the right to quiet enjoyment. In addition, this
U.S. at 240-41 (citing Old Dominion Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925); United States
v. Gettysburg Elec. R. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680) (1896)).
151. See id.
152. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
153. See id.
154. To pass conceivable rational basis review, the government must show that there is at
least a conceivable basis to believe its actions are related to a governmental purpose. It is not
necessary to establish a factual basis for this belief.
155. 467 U.S. at 241-42.
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standard insures that once the burden of proof shifts to the govern-
ment, it will have to provide more than speculative proof that a
project can be completed. Although such a standard does require the
government to show more than just remote possibilities or purely
hypothetical bases for completion, it is by no means an unreasonable
or unattainable burden.
This standard requires the government to produce factual rather
than conceptual proof that a project is feasible, but establishment of
those facts could be achieved in several ways. As discussed earlier,
where funds have not been secured for a project, a history of success-
ful attempts to obtain funding for similar projects may suffice to show
that such funding is likely to be obtained again. Or in cases where
physical impossibility of completion is alleged, alternate plans may
have already been created which disprove such allegations. Like the
burden-shifting test, the standard of review may require that legisla-
tive definitions or guidelines be established for determining impossi-
bility. Such legislative action would serve to further protect
landowners' rights by creating a clear and unambiguous standard to
be applied by the judiciary.
C. Counterarguments
Although the burden-shifting test and proposed standard of re-
view are common in constitutional jurisprudence in general, they
represent a marked departure from the prevailing approach to (or
avoidance of) inquiries into the feasibility of public necessity projects.
The two most likely counterarguments to the proposed application of
these concepts can be categorized as structural and economic.
1. Structural Arguments
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, "the role of the judiciary
in reviewing the legislative judgment is a narrow one."'15 6 Many state
courts argue that the only judicial inquiry related to a legislative
determination of feasibility that is ever appropriate is one based on
fraud, mistake, unreasonableness, orimpossibility. 15 While structural
concerns based on separation of powers dictate that review should be
performed narrowly, the case law indicates that the actual approach
156. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224 (1956).
157. See, e.g., id.; Comes v. City of Atlantic, 601 N.w.2d 93, 96 (Iowa 1999); Itasca County v.
Carpenter, 602 N.W.2d 887, 889-90 (Minn. App. Ct. 1999).
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taken has been to perform no review at all. Courts have repeatedly
expanded the definitions of terms like "unreasonable," "impossible,"
and "necessity" to avoid making any judicial inquiries into feasibility.
As a result of this avoidance, countless plots of land throughout
the country have been condemned to meet public necessities; yet, the
proposed projects still lie unfinished or not yet begun. 158 In most
cases, courts gave little if any consideration to the feasibility of these
now-abandoned projects. 15 9 Identification of projects with little or no
hope of being completed should occur before condemnation occurs,
not after. This would not require evaluating the feasibility of all or
even most of the proposed condemnations, only those that first meet
the narrow criteria of the burden-shifting test and then rational basis
review.
Challenging the constitutionality of a taking is not in and of itself
sufficient to place a burden on the government. The landowner holds
the initial burden of proof and must show through factual evidence
that the proposed project is impossible. Further judicial inquiry is
only appropriate where the landowner meets that burden. No burden
is placed on the government until that time, and the very deferential
rational basis in fact standard of review is applied to the government's
actions. This insures that the judiciary's role remains narrow. The
only cases subject to review are those where the landowner factually
establishes impossibility. Of that limited number of cases, only those
where the government fails to provide factual evidence that the
project is possible will result in a taking being overturned.
2. Economic Arguments
The most obvious economic argument against judicial review is
that allowing such review of project feasibility will flood the courts.' 6°
Specifically, it is argued that the amount of time and money it will
take to perform judicial inquiry in every public takings case is poten-
158. See, e.g., Capron v. State, 247 Cal. App. 2d 212 (1966) (holding that land could be taken
for state mental hospital project where that hospital was never built); Arechiga v. Hous. Auth.,
183 Cal. App. 2d 835 (1960) (holding land could be taken for public housing project where
housing was never actually built). Notably, the land at issue in Arechiga was later turned over
to the Brooklyn Dodgers as a means to entice the team to move to Los Angeles. See, e.g.,
Gideon Kanner, What to Do Until the Bulldozers Come? Precondemnation Planning for
Landowners, SD40 ALI-ABA I n.21 (1999).
159. Id.
160. Gideon Kanner, Recent Developments in Eminent Domain, SF54 ALI-ABA 1, 7-8
(2001).
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tially astronomical. 161 But like the structural arguments above, these
economic arguments are based on the faulty notion that judicial
inquiry into potentially unreasonable or impossible projects means
evaluating every project that is proposed. If properly applied, the test
and standard of review suggested by this Note are narrowly focused
and require evaluation of only those cases that are legitimately
unreasonable or impossible to complete.
Just as challenging the constitutionality of a taking is not suffi-
cient alone to place a burden on the government, it is also not suffi-
cient alone to justify judicial review. The only cases in which judicial
review would even be considered are those where the landowner has
shown the court that a factual basis to allege impossibility exists.
Only after the landowner has met that burden of proof will the court
perform any further inquiry. The burden-shifting test and rational
basis in fact standard of review serve to insure the number of cases
actually reviewed is limited. Such an approach may even yield net
economic savings, as the cost of many extravagant or irrational
projects may be avoided.
CONCLUSION
The Constitution allows the federal government and the states to
seize private land as long as the landowner is compensated and the
land is taken for a public use. 162 But some states are now able to seize
land that will never be put to such use by simply asserting their
intention to include the land in a public necessity project. States seize
land even when it is impossible or highly unlikely that such a project
will ever be completed. Judicial review of legislative determinations
of necessity has historically been extremely narrow and should
remain so. But the categorical refusal by some state courts to exam-
ine whether legislatively proposed takings will ever be used to meet a
necessity is unwarranted.
Property ownership is directly related to our self-fulfillment and
personhood as citizens. Eminent domain allows the government to
deny individuals not only the right to quiet enjoyment of their land,
but ownership of the land itself. It is essential, however, that the
government retains and exercises this power so that public necessities
can be met. The land used for roads, airports, schools, and countless
161. Id. at 8.
162. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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other public needs would have been impossible to acquire without
eminent domain powers. Protection of private citizens' property
rights from unconstitutional condemnation must be balanced against
the need for broad governmental powers of eminent domain. Apply-
ing a burden-shifting test and rational basis in fact review to the
feasibility of proposed necessity projects will maintain that balance.
